



Constructing the “City of international solidarity”: Non-aligned internationalism, the 
United Nations and visions of development, modernism and solidarity, 1955-1975 
 
Abstract: 
This article embeds the United Nations (UN) plan to reconstruct the city of Skopje after the 
1963 earthquake in a broader story about decolonisation, visions of post-war modernisation, 
Yugoslavia’s global role as a leader of the non-aligned world and the collaboration and 
tensions between developed and developing countries at the UN regarding economic 
development and technical assistance. With Warsaw’s Chief architect Adolf Ciborowski at 
the helm as project manager of the Skopje Urban Plan Project, the development plan for the 
city was arguably unlike any other operation of its kind undertaken by the United Nations 
Special Fund (later the UNDP). Drawing upon material from multiple archives, this article 
seeks to enlarge the scope of “socialist internationalism” and address what I call 
“internationalist constellations”, in order to account for the interconnectedness and cross-
fertilisation between liberal and socialist internationalisms and the role of non-aligned 
internationalism therein. 
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“The exhibition Solidarity, an Unfinished Project? [...] highlights the importance 
of asking ourselves if it is still possible to believe that somewhere within us lies a 
utopian spark worth preserving; a spark necessary not only for great changes but 
sometimes needed in order to persevere and to continue to defend the abandoned 
or forgotten idea of solidarity.” Museum of Contemporary Art, Skopje, October 
2014.  
 
The exhibition that opened in October 2014 at the Museum of Contemporary Art in 
Skopje was conceived as a tribute to the numerous international artists who contributed their 
works to the collection of the newly established Macedonian Museum of Contemporary Art 
after the 1963 Skopje earthquake, including Pablo Picasso, Victor Vasarely and Alexander 
Calder. Both the Museum’s collection and the Museum itself were products of an unrivalled 
exercise in UN-coordinated relief and trans-bloc international collaboration. While most of 
the collection was composed of West European and American art, the building was a gift 
from the communist Polish government, designed by the well-known group of Polish 
architects known as the “Warsaw Tigers”.1 Some of the most prominent initial gestures of 
solidarity in the aftermath of the 1963 Skopje earthquake, that left one of the eight regional 
Yugoslav capital cities almost completely destroyed, included: the 120-bed hospital 
dispatched in 24 United States Air Force C-130s under orders from President Kennedy the 
day after the earthquake; the battalion of Soviet military engineers; the British, Polish and 
                                                 
1 Jerzy Mokrzynski, Eugeniusz Wierzbicki and Waclaw Klyzewski. See: Boris Petkovski, 
Museum of Contemporary Art – Skopje, 1964-1976 (Skopje: Dossier MoCA, 2001); Tigers: 
The Architecture of Jerzy Mokrzynski, Eugeniusz Wierzbicki and Waclaw Klyzewski (Skopje: 
Embassy of the Republic of Poland, 2014).  
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Japanese experts in urban planning and reconstruction; and  one of the richest collections of 
contemporary art in Southern Europe. In the aftermath of the earthquake Yugoslav President 
Josip Broz Tito declared that Skopje would become a symbol of Yugoslav and international 
solidarity. A United Nations General Assembly resolution from October 1963 noted “with 
satisfaction that the spirit of international solidarity demonstrated on this occasion has 
transformed the reconstruction of Skopje into a real symbol of friendship and brotherhood 
among peoples.”2 The trope of international solidarity marked the decade of the 1960s and 
persisted both officially and unofficially as a prominent marker of global and urban 
citizenship. It shaped public discourse in the former socialist world and the former 
Yugoslavia and it was globally disseminated through international organisations and taken on 
by West European governments.     
This case provides a unique venue for contextualising post-WW2 internationalism at 
the intersection of liberal and socialist conceptions of internationalism. The socialist 
federation’s vision of international cooperation was conditioned by a unique Yugoslav self-
imposed bipolar neutralism; that is, an imperative to strike an almost perfect balance between 
the state socialist East and the industrialised West.3 On the one hand, this was underpinned by 
a genuine desire to combine “the best of both worlds”, and by an anxiety to appear neutral 
                                                 
2 “Measures in connexion with the earthquake at Skoplje, Yugoslavia”, General Assembly, 
accessed 28 December 2018, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/185/57/IMG/NR018557.pdf?OpenElement    
3 See: Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss, eds. Neutrality 
and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs? (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2016). On contemporary debates and reflections on the notion of “neutralism”, 
see: Peter Lyon, “Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism”, The Review 
of Politics 22/02 (1960): 255-268.   
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and live up to the ideal of active neutrality, on the other. This article embeds what has been 
referred to as “the first major international collaborative exercise of such magnitude” into a 
broader story about decolonisation, visions of post-war modernisation, Yugoslavia’s global 
role as a leader of the non-aligned world and the alliances and tensions between developed 
and developing countries at the UN.4 With Warsaw’s Chief architect Adolf Ciborowski at the 
helm as project manager of the Skopje Urban Plan Project (the Plan), it was arguably unlike 
any other operation of its kind undertaken by the United Nations Special Fund (later the UN 
Development Programme). The choice of experts (from the capitalist West, the socialist East 
and Japan) mirrored Yugoslavia’s and many of the developing world nations’ visions of 
hybrid modernity, where Western concepts and idioms of technological achievement, 
planning and construction could be translated and adapted to local contexts and fed into a 
form of post-colonial, post-revolutionary nationalism. By integrating and resorting to experts, 
initiatives and technologies from both sides of the Cold War divide, the Yugoslavs were also 
actively constructing their own post-war legitimacy, both at home and abroad, against voices 
which often blamed them for either being too pro-Western and hence betraying socialist 
ideals, or indeed too pro-Soviet and therefore only declaratively non-aligned. Although it 
needs to be acknowledged that all of these geographical and geopolitical markers - “East”, 
“West”, “North” and “South” - are indeed “metageographical constructs”5 and do not reflect 
the true complexity and diversity of the regions they usually stand for, they are used here to 
                                                 
4 Kenneth Watts, Outwards from Home: A Planner’s Odyssey, as cited in: Robert Home, 
“Reconstructing Skopje, Macedonia, after the 1963 earthquake: The Master plan forty years 
on”, Papers in Land Management No. 7 (Cambridge & Chelmsford: Anglia Ruskin 
University), 20. 
5 Martin W. Lewis and Kären Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography 
(Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press).  
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denote the self-positioning of the actors themselves and the categories and discursive 
frameworks they operated in. In that sense, this essay also seeks to reassess Cold War 
metageography and decentre the liberal/illiberal binary. It traces overlooked capitalist-
socialist alliances and shared values and argues that scholars of internationalism and of the 
Cold War should question these metageographical frameworks and any easy assumption that 
the “West” is coincident with liberalism and the “East” with illiberalism.  
The reconstruction and planning of the city of Skopje represent a powerful 
embodiment of developmental modernism, which as Rosemary Wakeman persuasively 
argues, was produced and managed by Western experts in alliance with local political and 
planning elites.6 Skopje was indeed the product of a post-war “golden age of new towns”.7 
But, at the same time, like Plymouth, for instance, it embodied a bold, optimistic vision of the 
post-war welfare state. However, Skopje was unique in that its planning and its construction 
in the modernist idiom was implemented and endorsed by the United Nations - unlike 
Brasilia or Chandigarh, for example. In the latter case, Jawaharlal Nehru personally engaged 
in the initiative for the construction of a new city in Indian Punjab after Partition that was to 
embody his own vision of “Indian modernity.”8 By contrast, Skopje was an exercise in 
                                                 
6 Rosemary Wakeman, Practicing Utopia: An Intellectual History of the New Town 
Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). See also: Martino Stierli and 
Vladimir Kulić, eds. Toward a Concrete Utopia: Architecture in Yugoslavia, 1948–1980 
(New York: The Museum of Modern Art, New York, 2018).  
7 Wakeman, Practicing Utopia, 1. 
8 Nihal Perera, “Contesting visions: hybridity, liminality and authorship of the Chandigarh 
plan”, Planning Perspectives 19/2 (2004): 175-199; Annapurna Shaw, “Town Planning in 
Postcolonial India, 1947-1965: Chandigarh Re-Examined”, Urban Geography 30/8 (2009): 
857-878.    
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developmental multilateralism. Different national traditions in building, design and planning 
came into conversation through the concepts of modernism and through the global networks 
of experts who sought to implement them. Eventually, the Skopje project strengthened and 
enhanced the role of international organisations in the dissemination of planning, construction 
and development ideas.  
In what follows I seek to enlarge the scope of what has been termed and widely 
studied within the framework of “socialist internationalism”, and for that matter also expand 
an existing typology of “internationalisms”, whether conservative, liberal or socialist, by 
introducing a new framework for the analysis of international cooperation beyond the two 
blocs.9 It examines what I refer to as “internationalist constellations”; that is, the 
interconnectedness and cross-fertilisation between liberal and socialist internationalisms, with 
non-aligned internationalism forming one of those constellations. More specifically, it 
analyses the dynamics of a technological and developmental internationalist constellation and 
its overlap with a cultural internationalist constellation in art and architecture. These two 
different but complementary examples capture well trans-bloc/trans-ideological and trans-
national convergences under the auspices of the UN. The former had its origins in the 
interwar “cults of technocracy and internationalism” and it embodied a post-war version of 
the interwar technocratic internationalism that comprised expert networks and a repertoire of 
technocratic thinking co-produced by the League of Nations and the International Labour 
Organisation.10 The existence of a technological and developmental internationalist 
                                                 
9 Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
10 Jo-Anne Pemberton, “New worlds for old: the League of Nations in the age of electricity,” 
Review of International Studies 28 (2002): 311–336. See also: Johan Schot and Vincent 
Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on 
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constellation will be demonstrated through the example of the physical rebuilding of the city, 
along with its establishment as a centre for seismic research and engineering. In addition, this 
article will interrogate the cultural internationalist constellation that embodied the highly 
networked art world (painters, sculptors, architects) of the global North and the modernist 
paradigm in art and architecture, as analysed through the architectural vision for the new city 
and the example of the above-mentioned Museum of Contemporary Art.   
Studying Yugoslavia and writing the non-aligned world back into histories of 
internationalism can add crucial new insights regarding the overlapping intersections of 
varieties of internationalisms (socialist and liberal in this case). The broader implications of 
this particular “constellation” reach beyond the simple confluence of different forms of 
expertise in the case of Skopje: at its core were shared ideas about the importance of 
international solidarity beyond ideological divides, a belief in the benefits of investing in 
sustainable development and technological progress for the benefit of all, and a commitment 
to a “welfare-state modernism”.11 Unique by virtue of the sheer magnitude of the 
reconstruction effort and the long-term development plan, as well as the involvement of 
multiple local and international actors from across the Cold War divide, the case of Skopje is 
a testament to the short-lived post-war convergence of liberal and socialist internationalisms, 
one that engendered a temporary global consensus around the primacy of modernism, 
welfare, solidarity and development.    
                                                                                                                                                        
Motorways and Electricity Networks,” Journal of Modern European History 6/2 (2008): 
196–217; Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot, Writing the Rules for Europe: Experts, Cartels, 
and International Organizations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 21-48.   
11 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (John 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 17. 
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I begin by situating socialist Yugoslavia within the UN system and the new geo-
political order at the onset of decolonisation and the establishment of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). I then chart the debates around development and the establishment of a 
Special Fund within the UN, which came to play a central role in the reconstruction and the 
development plan for the Yugoslav city. The last section of the article analyses the specific 
processes, networks and dynamics involved in the reconstruction, planning and development 
of Skopje, with the UN as an agent of a vision of developmental modernism defined by a 
fundamental belief in the benefits of international cooperation, technological progress and 
solidarity. 
      
Yugoslavia, the UN system and the birth of non-aligned multilateralism 
 
“Skopje, however, was a city that was once beautiful with minarets and domes, with new 
towers and small skyscrapers. It was a successful city, booming ahead with new factories, a 
huge electric steel manufacturing plant, as well as parks, beautiful neighbourhoods, and 
promenades. It was a growing city, full of energy, looking to the future, and then the 
earthquake dealt a staggering blow. Will it recover from the blow, and if so, how? […] How 
to rebuild anew?” 
Maurice Rotival, Report on Skopje, May 1964 
     
The disastrous earthquake that struck Skopje on 26 July 1963 destroyed 80% of all 
public buildings including hospitals, schools, theatres and the city’s railway station. Around 
1,200 people were killed, 3,500 were injured and the majority of the city’s population was 
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left homeless.12 Less than one fifth of dwellings escaped damage. A cable from UN 
Secretary-General U Thant to President Tito from July 1963 stressed that the United Nations 
“stands ready to offer every assistance within its resources” and that he had requested 
organisations within the UN system “to consider urgently the assistance which might be 
provided.”13 An impressive number of governments responded to these appeals by the UN 
and by the Yugoslav government for aid and assistance to a city, whose sudden, almost 
complete destruction appeared reminiscent of WW2 images of aerial bombardment and urban 
devastation, still fresh in many minds at the time. Parallels were drawn with Coventry and 
Warsaw and it was noted that in five seconds “Nature almost matched in Skopje the degree of 
physical havoc that it had taken all the military might of Nazi Germany five long years to 
wreak on Warsaw.”14 Another excerpt from Maurice Rotival’s report, the renowned French 
planner who was appointed under the UN Programme of Technical Assistance, offers a 
poignant example of this: “For a European, such a scene is familiar, for there have been two 
wars in which hundreds of cities have been hammered down with more thoroughness than by 
an earthquake. But it was not the same. It was the result of war and the people knew about it 
                                                 
12 Archive of the City of Skopje (hereafter ACS), 6.79 Фонд за помагање и обнова на град 
Скопје (1963-1977) [Fund for the help and reconstruction of Skopje (1963-1977)], box 2, 
“Izveštaj o zemljotresu u Skoplju i preduzetim merama za ublažavanje posledica, Beograd, 
Savezno Izvršno Veće, 31 avgusta 1963. godine“, 3.    
13 United Nations Archives (hereafter UNA), Secretary-General U Thant, S-0884-0024-02 
(Various countries - correspondence re natural disasters, 1962-1971), “United Nations Press 
Service, Cable from Secretary-General U Thant to President Tito of Yugoslavia”, 26 July 
1963.   
14 Skopje Resurgent: The Story of a United Nations Special Fund Town Planning Project 
(New York: United Nations, 1970), 37.   
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and understood the price that had to be paid for victory.”15 This conditioned the type of 
technical assistance required and the Liverpool firm Moran and Long which had acquired 
expertise in the repair of blitzed buildings during the Battle of Britain was commissioned by 
the UN to conduct the first comprehensive study.16  
President Tito lauded “the manifestation of human solidarity which has come to 
expression on this occasion in the great family of nations.”17 The enthusiastic and rather 
unprecedented response, was, I argue, directly related to Yugoslavia’s increasing visibility on 
the global stage. It represented above all a pragmatic act for the big powers, destabilising the 
homogeneity of the other bloc by endorsing the new policy of non-alignment. Moreover, in 
the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that had brought the world to the brink of a 
nuclear disaster, the Non-Aligned Movement’s calls for nuclear disarmament struck chords 
and seemed to offer a viable alternative. It is safe to conclude that the political capital 
Yugoslavia had accrued internationally from the beginning of the 1950s influenced the geo-
political prestige and positive publicity it enjoyed around the time of the earthquake and in 
the following two decades. This was complemented by the social and cultural capital 
                                                 
15 UNA, UN Registry (1954-1983)/Technical Assistance, S-0175-2221-04, 322/1 YUGO 
(240-3) (UN Technical Assistance Mission in Yugoslavia, Earthquake Reconstruction 
Programme-Skoplje), “Report on Skopje Prepared for the Government of Yugoslavia by 
Maurice E. H. Rotival, 26 May 1964.”  
See also: Carola Hein, “Maurice Rotival: French planning on a world-scale,” Planning 
Perspectives 17/3 (2002): 247-265.  
16 Skopje Resurgent, 87.  
17 UNA, Secretary-General U Thant, S-0884-0024-02, “His Excellency U Thant Secretary 
General (telegram from Josip Broz Tito),” 7 August 1963.  
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accumulated through the inter-personal networks of Yugoslav diplomats and experts within 
the UN system.  
The UN’s dramatic enlargement in the 1960s transformed it into an unprecedented 
forum for publicity, encounter and debate for newly independent countries. Unlike most of its 
non-aligned partners, socialist Yugoslavia was one of the founding members of the United 
Nations and an original signatory of the UN Charter at the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization (UNCIO) in San Francisco in May-June 1945, where the Yugoslav 
delegation headed by the foreign minister Ivan Šubašić had stressed the “close 
interdependency of the world” and the importance of international solidarity in safeguarding 
peace.18 The speech by Šubašić presaged some of the core principles of Yugoslav non-
alignment and the ethos of active neutrality and peaceful coexistence, at a time when 
Yugoslavia was still formally part of the Soviet alliance:   
“The solidarity among the United Nations can only be maintained through the 
recognition and the application of the principle of sovereign equality of all the 
members – small and large alike – of the future international organization [...] 
Yugoslavia is a signatory of the Declaration of the United Nations and she looks 
upon all the statements of the major allies – from the Atlantic Charter to the 
agreements of Moscow and the Crimea – as pillars of a new and better world. Her 
                                                 
18 Jadranka Jovanović, Jugoslavija u Organizaciji Ujedinjenih Nacija (1945-1953.) (Beograd: 
Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985), 16.   
See also: Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World (Princeton University 
Press, 1970); Leo Mates, Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade/New York: 
Institute of International Politics and Economics/Oceana Publications, 1972); Edvard Kardelj, 
Istorijski koreni nesvrstavanja (Beograd: Komunist, 1975); Tvrtko Jakovina, Treća strana 
hladnog rata (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011).  
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peoples believe that organized international solidarity (emphasis added) can and 
will succeed if based on the principles of peace, justice and security.”19  
Although Šubašić’s diplomatic career was short and he resigned from his post in October 
1945, most of the principles he underlined in his speech would remain and continue to 
underpin Yugoslav foreign relations until the country’s dissolution in 1991. The centrality of 
the UN for the Yugoslav elites and its role in the shaping of their worldviews and policies at 
home cannot be overemphasised, not least because a commitment to the principles of the UN 
Charter was spelled out in the Yugoslav federal Constitution. The Constitution stated that in 
its international relations Yugoslavia adhered to the principles of the Charter, fulfilled its 
international commitments, and actively participated in the work of the international 
organisations to which it was affiliated.20 These ideas continued to inform Yugoslav foreign 
policy and the country’s role in its subsequent engagements with the developing world. More 
importantly, driven by an impetus to transform the United Nations “from a Euro-American 
into a universal organization”, through the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 
developing countries (G77) Yugoslavia and its neutral allies managed to increase the visibility 
                                                 
19 UNA, San Francisco Conference-Country Files, S-0596-0008-0004 (Files by country: 
Yugoslavia), “United Nations Conference on International Organisation (For the Press), 
Address by Dr. Ivan Subasic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia and Chairman of the 
Yugoslav Delegation”, 2 May, 1945.   
20 “Main Principles”, Part VII, The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1963). 
The 1963 Yugoslav federal Constitution was hailed at the time as “an outstanding piece of 
juristic work” and “one of the most original and interesting documents in modern 
constitutional history”. See: Ivo Lapenna, “The Yugoslav Constitution of 1963,” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 18/2 (1969): 469-471.   
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of the “global South” across the UN system.21 Not only was the NAM meant to provide voice 
and exposure for “the voiceless ones in the world” 22, in the words of President Ahmed 
Sukarno of Indonesia, it also enabled them to act collectively regarding issues such as 
development and global inequality. As Odde Arne Westad has illustratively pointed out, 
“[l]ecturing the superpowers on the conduct of international relations was a powerful sign that 
the Third World was coming of age.”23  
In an interview for a Japanese newspaper in 1951, Josip Broz Tito emphasised the 
centrality of the UN system for safeguarding world peace, stating that “We have always 
maintained that the best way of preserving peace is through the United Nations. That is why 
we should preserve the unity of the United Nations as the institution for solving of 
international problems. All post-war problems which still need to be solved could be more or 
less adequately settled only through the United Nations system or one of its organs.”24 It was 
precisely during this period of the early 1950s that Yugoslavia began to discover new allies 
and a way of reinventing its role at global level after the 1948 split with the Soviet Union. In 
1950-1951 both Yugoslavia and India sat on the UN Security Council (SC) as non-permanent 
                                                 
21 Ranko Petković, Non-Aligned Yugoslavia and the Contemporary World: the foreign policy 
of Yugoslavia: 1945-1985 (Belgrade/Zagreb: Međunarodna politika/Školska knjiga, 1986), 
337.  
22 Christopher J. Lee, “Between a Moment and an Era: the Origins and Afterlives of 
Bandung”, in Making a World after Empire: the Bandung Moment and Its Political 
Afterlives, ed. Christopher J. Lee (Ohio University Press, 2010), 5.  
23 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of 
Our Times (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 107.  




elected members, overlapping with Egypt’s own Security Council mandate in 1949-1950.25 
This was the period during which the Yugoslav delegation developed meaningful dialogue 
and cooperation with India’s and Egypt’s representatives at the UN: India’s foremost jurist 
and permanent representative to the UN from 1949-1952, Sir Benegal Narsing Rau; and 
Mahmoud Fawzi, a senior Egyptian diplomat and foreign minister under Nasser.26 These 
early encounters drew the Yugoslav diplomats’ attention to the questions raised by former 
colonies and gradually shaped Yugoslavia’s engagement with the global South and its 
increasingly positive image abroad. More importantly still, a regular and close coordination 
between UN Secretary-General U Thant and the Yugoslav government persisted from 1961 
until 1971. U Thant’s first official trip to Yugoslavia as Secretary-General, in May 1963, was 
actually his third. His first visit was during U Nu’s official visit to Belgrade in 1954 and the 
second as part of the Burmese delegation at the first Non-Aligned Summit in Belgrade in 
1961. During his official visit to Yugoslavia in August 1970, Thant stated that in his 
conversation with President Tito they found that “some of the items before the [NAM] 
Lusaka conference happen to be identical with items before the twenty-fifth General 
                                                 
25 Yugoslavia had three further mandates in the SC: in 1956, 1972 – 1973, and 1988 – 1989. 
For a complete list of countries which have been elected members of the SC, see: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp   
26 Pedersen specifically cites the example of Yugoslav diplomats to reinforce his argument 
about the importance of the role of individual representatives at the UN: “the ability and 
friendly attitude of Yugoslav diplomats in the United Nations, to cite one example, have 
undoubtedly influenced the views of many other delegates about Yugoslavia.” Richard F. 
Pedersen, “National Representation in the United Nations,” International Organization 15 
(1961): 256-266.  
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Assembly session.”27 On this occasion, while visiting Skopje and reviewing the progress of 
various UNDP projects, Thant was presented with honorary citizenship for his extraordinary 
personal contribution “to the establishment of international actions of solidarity for assistance 
to the City and the citizens of Skopje”.28     
Yugoslavia’s non-aligned foreign policy course was coupled with important domestic 
considerations, namely, domestic stability.29 Pioneering coexistence at a global level mirrored 
a Yugoslav-specific preoccupation with national and religious coexistence domestically. Tito 
himself openly underlined the fact that the core principles of non-alignment (including 
independence, sovereignty and equitable international cooperation) underpinned the 
Yugoslav interwar revolutionary movement and the WW2 antifascist struggle. As he 
declared:  
“The basic principles of Yugoslavia’s internal setup overlap with the principles 
we pursue in our international relations […] And those are the same principles 
we pursue in our foreign policy. In brief, self-management at home and non-
alignment in international relations form the whole of Yugoslav independent 
politics.”30        
                                                 
27 UNA, Secretary-General U Thant, S-0883-0026-16 (Trip to Yugoslavia and Ethiopia, 27 
August - 3 September 1970, press releases), “United Nations Press Services, Press Release 
SG/T/332, Secretary-General Hold Talks With President Tito of Yugoslavia”, 31 August 
1970.     
28 Ibid.  
29 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World (Princeton University Press, 
1970), 72. 
30 Pero Damjanović, et al., eds. Josip Broz Tito: autobiografska kazivanja (drugi tom) 
(Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1982), 109. 
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Yugoslavia’s exceptional visibility and active engagement on the international stage 
throughout the 1950s and the 1960s was a critical context for the UN’s response to Skopje’s 
earthquake, as well as the response of individual countries. It also contributed to an emerging 
international consensus on development and visions of postcolonial modernisation. Both 
state-led and individual initiatives and engagements contributed to the proliferation of this 
multilateral constellation where small and medium-sized states like Yugoslavia could play 
active roles. A number of Yugoslav experts at different levels of the UN contributed to the 
consolidation of this multilateral constellation, not least because the position of the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe’s Executive Secretary from 1960 to 1982 was held by two 
Yugoslavs: Vladimir Velebit (1960-1967) and Janez Stanovnik (1968-1982). In addition to 
the official level and state diplomatic engagement, there were individual experts such as 
architect Ernest Weissmann, who headed the UN Centre for Housing, Building and Planning 
and who was appointed Chairman of the International Board of Consultants for the 
reconstruction of Skopje (originally “Consultative Group”). Indeed, Weissmann’s Yugoslav 
citizenship helped facilitate the inclusion of planners from across the Iron Curtain in UN 
planning missions and also helped in lifting suspicions among elites in the developing world 




                                                 
31 Stephen V. Ward, “Transnational planners in a postcolonial world,” in Crossing Borders: 
International Exchange and Planning Practices, eds. Patsy Healey and Robert Upton 
(Routledge, 2010), 53.  
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New visions: paradigm shift and the “golden age” of development cooperation in 
the 1960s 
 
Given the extent of the post-earthquake damage of the city of Skopje, seismological 
and geological studies had to precede the preparation of the new Urban Plan. The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) seismology experts 
Nicholas Ambrasey and Jean Despeyroux were against moving the city away from its present 
location, particularly since the city’s underground infrastructure did not suffer any damage. In 
the words of Sudhir Sen, the resident representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board 
and Director of the Special Fund programmes in Yugoslavia, the city plan was meant to be 
based “on the most modern scientific achievements in the field of seismology”.32 Upon Sen’s 
suggestion, Ernest Weissmann visited Skopje in August 1963 and he prepared a report which 
recommended firstly, an emergency programme and secondly, long-term reconstruction and 
development. Weissmann was a student of the modernist architect Le Corbusier, and 
according to him, the “obvious aim of planning [was] to control man’s environment for the 
benefit of the people. And when I say the people – I mean the people, not the planners. And 
when I say benefit, I mean the achievement of a better life for the many…”33 Weissmann was 
                                                 
32 UNA, UN Registry (1954-1983)/Technical Assistance, S-0175-2221-04, 322/1 YUGO 
(240-3), “International solidarity is also reflected in concrete and considerable assistance; 
Interview with Mr. Sudhir Sen, Representative of TAB and Director of Special Fund 
programmes in Yugoslavia.” 
33 As cited in Eric Paul Mumford, The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960 
(Cambridge: MIT press, 2000), 144. On Weissmann’s role, see also: Ines Tolić, “Ernest 
Weissmann’s ‘World City’”: The Reconstruction of Skopje within the Cold War Context, 
Southeastern Europe 41/2 (2017): 171-199.  
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in support of an international team of experts and recommended to the Director for Special 
Fund activities that “the Yugoslavs should have the benefit of wider advice in the planning of 
the city than is possible from one firm of consultants.”34 Weissmann was also the Chair of the 
International Board of Consultants on Skopje whose report from March 1964 recommended 
the establishment of an Institute for Engineering Seismology and Urban Planning and the 
preparation of a physical plan of the wider region as a multiple purpose project (irrigation, 
electric power, and water supply). This clearly resonated with the long-term, sustainable 
development paradigm which the UN, the Special Fund and the Yugoslav state shared in 
terms of vision and priority. The Board also recommended an international town planning 
and architectural competition for the city centre, to be organised with the help of the UN and 
under the supervision of the Board and the Yugoslav Association of Architects and Urbanists. 
The whole project was deemed to be “a lesson in the application of modern science, 
engineering and physical planning.”35 More importantly, however, Skopje was to provide a 
blueprint for other parts of the globe with high seismicity, especially in the developing world, 
so that “the lessons learned here be applied elsewhere.”36           
The UN Special Fund, which came to play a central role in Skopje’s reconstruction, 
was a compromise solution following the long “struggle over SUNFED”– the Special UN 
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35 Ibid.  
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Fund for Economic Development, which was mainly opposed by the USA, the UK and 
Canada. However, “Washington’s distinctly negative stance towards SUNFED” was not 
upheld by other Western European states such as France and the Netherlands, for instance.37 
Yugoslav diplomats at the UN enthusiastically reported to Belgrade that Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden supported the establishment of SUNFED and an increasing number of industrial 
nations showed understanding for the demands of the developing world.38 This particular 
internationalist constellation around the establishment of a special UN fund for economic 
development was predicated upon a particular understanding of (under) development and 
domestic and global (in) equality. Hence, Sir Hans Singer, the respected UN developmental 
economist, who was well-known for the “Prebisch-Singer thesis” on the declining terms of 
trade for developing countries and who pioneered the idea of low-interest loans for 
developing countries and worked on the establishment of SUNFED, was attacked by 
American conservatives and the McCarthy press as a socialist. However, this does not imply 
that US public opinion unequivocally endorsed this view or that there was a widely shared 
consensus. Again, there were shifting constellations that embodied hybrid visions of 
internationalism. Since initial debates made the setting up of SUNFED conditional upon 
world disarmament, opposing voices picked up on the seeming absurdity of this claim. The 
New York Times editorial from 1 February 1957 echoed those views which in the Cold War 
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context could be easily stigmatised as socialist: “We are not poor in money or generosity. 
Why should we be so poor in faith, courage and compassion that we must wait for general 
disarmament before we join our UN neighbours to do some helpful things that politics and 
other reasons keep us from doing unilaterally?”39 Since consensus on SUNFED could not be 
reached, on 14 December 1957, the General Assembly unanimously decided to establish a 
special fund for technical assistance instead of a capital development fund. The United 
Nations Special Fund was officially inaugurated on 1 January 1959. Hence, a new 
internationalist constellation that formed around decolonisation, universal membership at the 
UN, and the Kennedy administration’s responsiveness to proposals about a development 
decade, underpinned what Robert Cox, a scholar and long-time UN officer at the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) termed “a shift in the dominant ideology to 
developmentalism”.40 
Although dependent on individual state policies, development agendas in the post-war 
period reflected various geopolitical entanglements and evolved in response to the debates 
channelled through the various bodies of the UN. These “transnational development 
regimes”41 arguably “illustrated the linkage between forms of decolonization and Cold War 
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rivalries.”42 Indeed, competing capitalist and socialist visions of development for the newly 
independent states reflected very pragmatic goals about defining spheres of interest. For 
instance, Soviet experts expressed concerns that “capitalist “aid” to tropical Africa […] aims 
to push these countries on the capitalist path of development” and that “political 
independence has still not brought radical changes in the pattern of economic relations 
between these countries and foreign capital.”43 At the same time, foreign aid for post-colonial 
and under-developed countries was indeed regarded as an instrument of foreign policy and “a 
weapon of the cold war”.44 The 1963 Clay Committee Report on the United States’ foreign 
aid policy stated, for example, that “we live in a world in which poverty, sickness and turmoil 
are rife and where a relentless Communist imperialism manipulates this misery to subvert 
men and nations from freedom’s cause. A foreign aid programme is one instrument among 
many which we and other developed countries adequately can afford and vigorously must use 
in the defence and advancement of free world interests.”45 In the view of the Yugoslav elite, 
aid was supposed to be largely unconditional, as “international assistance can contribute to 
historical progress only if it is given without military or political conditions”.46 Moreover, 
Yugoslavia was one of the sponsors of the 1952 Resolution on “Financing of economic 
development of under-developed countries” which called for the establishment of a special 
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fund for grants-in-aid and low interest, long-term loans to under-developed countries.47 This 
in turn paved the way for the establishment of the Special Fund and the UNDP into which it 
was merged in 1965 - amalgamated with EPTA, the UN Expanded program for technical 
assistance.  
As I have argued, the UN Special Fund was regarded as a transient compromise in the 
bargaining and the debate between donor and recipient countries over the establishment of an 
international capital development fund.48 At the same time, however, there was a hope that 
the Special Fund would represent a stepping stone for SUNFED. Although both the Special 
Fund and the International Development Association (affiliated with the World Bank) 
established in September 1960 were regarded as results of a compromise and “weak 
substitutes”, the Special Fund unlocked resources that advanced skill and expertise formation 
and promoted development.49 For instance, prior to 1963, three Special Fund projects had 
been approved for Yugoslavia: a project operated by the ILO (USD 1,044,000) to help the 
Federal Institute of Productivity establish and expand eleven centres for the training of 
vocational instructors; a project operated by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
(USD 1,037,100) for a pilot land reclamation scheme in the lower Neretva river valley; and a 
project operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (USD 546,400) to set 
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up research facilities with the Institute for application of nuclear research in agriculture, 
forestry and veterinary sciences.50   
A conviction that only cooperation across ideological and national boundaries could 
foster sustainable development and right the wrongs of colonialism and of the pre-WW2 
order defined the engagements of the Yugoslav elite and expert community at the UN. 
However, this belief was shared across the socialist and the non-socialist worlds and 
propelled the establishment of numerous UN bodies and initiatives, not least the Special 
Fund, which came to play a key role in what was arguably the first major international 
collaborative effort to prepare a development plan for a sizeable city, in the words of British 




In December 1962, to mark the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations, the UN 
General Assembly proposed 1965 be declared International Cooperation Year.52 The idea was 
conceptualised around a rather vague belief that more intensive cooperation across national 
boundaries would facilitate the settlement of major international problems and would lead to 
                                                 
50 UNA, Secretary-General U Thant, S-0883-0003-06 (Trip to Europe, 1-11 May 1963 – 
Yugoslavia), “Yugoslavia: Programme of Technical Co-operation”, 2-3.  
51 Watts, Outwards from Home: A Planner’s Odyssey, as cited in: Robert Home, 
“Reconstructing Skopje”. 





a better appreciation of the common interests of mankind.53 It was around this time, in 1962-
63, that the city councils of Skopje and Bradford started negotiating a twinning agreement. 
Indeed, the International Cooperation Year (ICY) framework gave an impetus to this form of 
trans-European and East-West collaboration.54 In the aftermath of the 1963 earthquake that 
hit Skopje, a team of students from the Bradford Institute of Technology (later the University 
of Bradford), assisted in the reconstruction efforts and helped cement long-term cooperation 
between the two universities and the two cities, owing much to the personal engagement of 
historian and geographer Fred Singleton, the Chairman of the newly-established Research 
Unit in Yugoslav Studies in 1965. Interestingly, despite the utopian sounding language of the 
International Cooperation Year resolutions, it was taken up by Western European – in this 
case British – elites, whose enthusiasm matched that of their partners in socialist Yugoslavia. 
HRH Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh was the Patron and Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
one of the sponsors of the ICY.55 His message on this occasion demonstrates that there was a 
shared belief in a better future made possible by technological advancement, multilateralism 
through the UN and a somewhat utopian notion of a human brotherhood: “In the twentieth 
year of the United Nations Organisation the advance of all branches of science and 
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technology holds out a bright prospect for all mankind […] International Co-Operation Year 
provides an opportunity for everyone to make a personal contribution to world understanding. 
Here is a chance to make a bonfire of prejudice and to re-affirm the brotherhood of men”.56 
One aspect in particular relates to the type of aid and assistance that was offered to 
Skopje by socialist and capitalist donor countries, and this reveals an existing international 
“social” consensus, a shared set of values that transcended Cold War divides. This was the 
investment of socialist and Western governments in institutions that embody social justice 
and the welfare state as a testament of sorts to a still existing post-war consensus around 
“welfare-state modernism”.57 This consensus is evident in the material help provided by the 
USA and the UK for the building of  two high schools  (including one for students of 
Albanian origin); a modern primary school named “Heinrich Pestalozzi” gifted by the Swiss 
government; a state of the art chemistry high school “Maria Sklodowska Curie” from the 
Polish government; a modern maternity hospital from the Czechoslovak trade union 
federation; a children’s pulmonary hospital from the Norwegian government and the Swedish 
Red Cross; and a policlinic called “Bucharest” from the Romanian government. In addition to 
these, theatres, concert halls, and whole residential areas (such as the “Dexion” 
neighbourhood named after the British company which provided building frame materials, 
the “Taftalidze” settlement consisting of prefabs from Finland, Norway, Czechoslovakia, 
France, Mexico, Italy, Poland and Switzerland), were financially supported by both socialist 
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and Western governments and came to embody the spirit of international solidarity referred 
to in the original UN resolution. However, on the ground, in the initial stages of the housing 
program there were major challenges regarding the completion of the new residential 
neighbourhoods and the proper timing of the different phases, as the prompt response in the 
delivery of prefabricated housing often meant that residents had to move into residential areas 
lacking basic infrastructure such as water supply, canalisation, road access or grocery 
stores.58      
For Yugoslav officials the most pressing issue was the shortage of experts in 
seismological engineering. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, Yugoslav officials 
stated that the best institution to train domestic experts would be the International Institute for 
Seismology in Tokyo.59 Yet, the priority would be, in their view, to commence working on an 
initiative for the establishment of a domestic Seismological Institute which would have a 
Yugoslav, but also regional (Mediterranean) character and scope.60 This reasoning was very 
much in line with the concept of “(collective) self-reliance” which became one of the core 
developmental principles pioneered by the NAM and the G77. The international consultative 
board which had been jointly appointed by the UN and the Yugoslav Government to support 
national and international reconstruction efforts also recommended the establishment of the 
“Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Seismology” at the University of 
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Skopje. It was founded in 1965 with the assistance of both the UNDP and UNESCO. The 
first post-graduate study program began that same year and this was one of the first 
comprehensive courses in earthquake engineering in Europe. The visiting lecturers, who 
hailed from all over the world - Japan, the USA, the USSR, the UK, India, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, New Zealand, Canada, and Denmark - mirrored the country’s self-imposed 
imperative to appear neutral and true to its non-aligned identity.      
On 29 September 1965, at a ceremony held at the Institute for Urban Development 
and Architecture, the Mayor of Skopje was presented with the Basic Urban Plan – the product 
of the work of over 150 experts, most from the Polish “Polservis” who drew up the social 
survey, the regional and general plans, and from Athens-based “Doxiadis Associates” who 
worked on housing, transport and infrastructure in collaboration with domestic Yugoslav 
teams.61 Both Polservis and Doxiadis had Baghdad’s master plan as part of their portfolio, 
albeit in different political contexts.62 While Adolf Ciborowski as Warsaw’s head architect 
between 1954 and 1964 was the public face of the international repute and prestige Polish 
urban planning enjoyed stemming from the international endorsement of the reconstruction of 
Poland after WW2, Constantinos Doxiadis was well known among American and 
international development circles, not least as the administrator of Marshall Plan aid to 
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Greece. The Skopje master plan was celebrated as the visionary product of an international 
collective effort, embodying the best of scientific and technological progress and 
transnational solidarity. In the words of the Mayor Blagoj Popov, “Drawn up in excellent 
cooperation with the United Nations and several organisations – the Plan represents the 
product of one of the most outstanding examples of international solidarity…”63 Not 
surprisingly, however, a process of intense collaboration in multi-national teams was meant 
to produce a number of challenges, not least conflicting professional assessments stemming 
from the experts’ diverse national professional traditions and training. Moreover, the entire 
project in all its complexity had to fit the specific, complex legal and political structures of 
socialist Macedonia and Yugoslavia. Hence, the fact that in spite of that “the system worked, 
and the plan was largely achieved on the ground”,64 further accentuates the importance of the 
political and the social context of the time – domestically, this was the central role played by 
the state, and internationally, the particular brand of post-war technocratic internationalism 
with a mission to re-make the world.    
A separate international competition was launched for the urban design of the city 
centre. An international jury headed by Weissmann awarded the project of renowned 
Japanese architect Kenzo Tange and a project of two Yugoslav/Croatian planners – Radovan 
Miščević and Fedor Vencler. Nevertheless, different aspects and recommendations from all 
of the eight submitted entries were eventually incorporated in the urban plan.65 The city’s 
master plan and urban development over the next two decades became a testament to the 
“developmental modernism” and the internationalist modernist paradigm in urban design, 
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stemming from the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM), not least because 
the key figures involved in the Skopje project through the UN, including Weissmann, 
Meyerson, Tange, Doxiadis, and Bakema, were associated with CIAM at various stages in 
their careers.66 Martin Meyerson, the American member of the International Board of 
Consultants on Skopje, had met Kenzo Tange in 1951 through the CIAM network, which was 
also where Meyerson met Ernest Weissmann. Meyerson was also part of the Doxiadis’ Delos 
Symposia.67 Both of them were also involved in the UN-sponsored project of the Bandung 
School of Regional and City Planning in the late 1950s.68 Tange, well-connected 
internationally through CIAM and a close friend of Constantinos Doxiadis, represented the 
generational shift and the shift away from the consensus around the Functional City 
prescribed by the 1933 Athens Charter. By the early 1960s, Tange had achieved international 
acclaim for combining traditional Japanese motifs and modernist elements and wielded 
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significant influence over the young Metabolist movement.69 His 1960 proposal for Tokyo 
Bay gained international attention and triggered discussions on city planning, but was also 
criticised for its monumentality and technological determinism, something that would be also 
held against him by critics of Skopje’s overly brutalist architectural heritage.70 Tange saw 
Yugoslavia’s socialist political system as an advantage and thought that public land 
ownership in this case was on his side.71  
Yugoslavia’s experience with the Special Fund and the UNDP around the Skopje 
earthquake cemented a long history of cooperation and circulation of knowledge and 
expertise. In 1970, the country’s voluntary contribution to the UNDP amounted to USD 
750,000 and it had 172 experts serving abroad.72 The technical assistance component between 
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1950 and 1970 was estimated to be USD 11 million at the time.73 UN officials were 
especially keen to make sure the expertise they invested in was used in other countries and 
diffused in a long-term and sustainable fashion. Hence, the UNDP emphasised that three 
senior experts who were engaged in the reconstruction of Skopje were recruited by the UN to 
take part in the UN task force for the reconstruction of ravaged areas in Peru in the aftermath 
of the Ancash earthquake in May 1970.74 The presence of the UNDP continued throughout 
the 1970s and into the 1980s with another programme for postgraduate training for national 
and international civil engineers, architects, geophysicists and physicists in the field of 
earthquake engineering, financed under the UNDP’s Technical Assistance Component from 
1977 to 1983. Under the formula of technical co-operation between developing countries 
(TCDC), which along with ECDC (economic cooperation among developing countries) 
formed the core of NAM’s and G77’s policy of collective self-reliance, the Institute worked 
together with the UNDP to promote understanding and teaching of engineering seismology in 
other developing countries in the region.75 The immediate objectives of the project were to 
contribute to this end by opening its present training course to participants from countries in 
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the region including Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Libya, 
Morocco, Portugal, Romania, Tunisia and Turkey.76  
The UN’s framework, direction and support was crucial to the international 
constellation of technical assistance and development. A trans-Atlantic dimension was added 
in 1972 when the Institute, in cooperation with the California Institute of Technology in 
Pasadena (until 1975) and the US Geological Survey in Menlo Park (until 1979) undertook a 
project on the “Installation of a strong motion instrument network on the territory of 
Yugoslavia”. This formed one of the largest strong-motion accelerograph and seismoscope 
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I. UNDP Program   




- Skopje Urban Plan (1965) 1,475,400 3,372,200 
- Training Centre for Building Construction 
Personnel (1965), ILO as Executing Agency   
485,600 661,000 
- Studies on the Regulation and Control of the 
Vardar River (1966)  
1,479,300 4,623,000 
- Survey of the Seismicity of the Balkan Region 
(Regional with HQ in Skopje) (1970) 
765,000 1,100,000 
- Integrated development of the Vardar/Axios River 
Basin (Yugoslavia/Greece) 
1,240,000 1,900,000 
I.II. TA Component (contingency funds 1963-70) $728,000 
I.III. WFP Post-Earthquake Emergency Assistance $1,700,000 
II. Funds Committed by the Yugoslav Government 
for the Reconstruction of Skopje 
$480,000,000 
III. Foreign Loans and Grants for the 
Reconstruction of Skopje (USA, UK, France, 
USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR)  
$96,000,000 
 
Figure 1. Source: United Nations Archive, Secretary-General U Thant, S-0883-0026-12, 
“Skopje: the city of international solidarity.”  
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UNESCO also played a major role from the very beginning. It was crucial in the 
formation and subsistence of the cultural internationalist constellation that formed around the 
establishment of the Skopje Museum of Contemporary Art. In the aftermath of the 
earthquake, the International Association of Art (IAA/AIAP) resolved to invite its members 
to donate their works of art to the future Museum in Skopje.78 The origins of IAA/AIAP can 
be traced to the Third General UNESCO Conference held in Beirut in 1948, although the 
Association itself was established in 1954 at the initiative of UNESCO. The response was 
overwhelmingly positive and by the beginning of the 1970s the Museum had a collection of 
around 2000 pieces of art, with Pablo Picasso’s “Head of a woman” being the most 
prominent and most valuable donation. Although the new building designed by the Polish 
“Tigers” and Warsaw’s General Construction Design Bureau was not finished until 1970, the 
first exhibition of the donated works of art took place in 1965 and was titled the “Solidarity 
meeting”/”Rencontre de solidarité”. The fact that the special catalogue was printed in three 
languages (Macedonian, English and Russian) is yet another manifestation of the bipolar 
neutrality that underpinned Yugoslav non-aligned internationalism and the majority of 
internationalist constellations in which the Yugoslav elites were circulating and actively 
constructing.        
Writing in 1970, British artist, critic and historian of art and culture Kennet Coutts-
Smith underlined “solidarity” and “cultural aid” as the core of this internationalist 
constellation of the world of modern art. More importantly, he located in the Museum and its 
role a “cultural nexus” that transcended political and cultural boundaries:  
“One interesting way in which this “solidarity” has operated in the art world can 
be seen in Skopje, Yugoslavia. After the disastrous earthquake of 1963 people 
throughout the world responded with medical and material aid. The international 
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art world also reacted, denoting “cultural aid” and painters and sculptors from 
many different countries gave works of art to rebuild the museum. The result of 
this is that Skopje now possesses one of the best collections of modern art in 
South Europe. The remarkable thing is that a certain “spirit of solidarity” has been 
kept alive largely due to the efforts of the Director of the Museum of 
Contemporary Art, Boris Petkovski, whereby this museum has acted as a cultural 
nexus transcending political and cultural barriers and permitting art to operate 
genuinely outside of the national and promotional complex…”79  
Institutional precedent was as fundamental to the existence of that “cultural nexus” as the 
non-aligned framework. Socialist Yugoslavia had a large number of galleries and museums 
of modern art, and many of its architects, museum curators and artists went on state-funded 
study visits abroad, mostly in Western Europe and the USA. The first director of the 
Museum, Boris Petkovski spent a year in France and pointed to the New National Gallery in 
Berlin (designed by Mies van der Rohe) which opened in 1968 as his inspiration for the 
Macedonian Museum. As early as 1952, the National Gallery in Skopje, which was the 
Museum’s predecessor, hosted an exhibition of French modern art, which was followed by 
exhibitions of “100 years Dutch painting” (1953), of Henry Moore (1955), Modern Italian art 
(1956), Modern Polish art (1957) and Modern American art (1961), the latter in collaboration 
with the Guggenheim.80  
It was the shared paradigm of (high) modernism and an endorsement of non-
alignment as a model of trans-bloc cooperation that allowed for the convergence of artists, 
                                                 
79 Kenneth Coutts Smith, The Dream of Icarus (London: Hutchinson, 1970).  
80 See: Želimir Koščević, “Henry Moore’s Exhibition in Yugoslavia, 1955”, British Art 
Studies, accessed 28 December, 2017, http://www.britishartstudies.ac.uk/issues/issue-
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curators, architects, planners and state officials from across the Cold War divide in this 
internationalist constellation sustained by the United Nations and by a temporary global 
consensus around international cooperation and solidarity. Although unique by virtue of the 
scope of international involvement, Skopje was really a product of its age, one of several 
post-war examples of cities of the welfare state which embodied a particular, optimistic 
vision for a new world where progress was a given; with “streets open to everybody […] its 
buildings communal and its plan ordered […] designed for an equally ordered society which 
had been given the opportunity to devote itself to education, work and culture”, to borrow 




The early 1960s represent a rather unique period in Cold War history, marked by 
fundamental shifts in an inherited global status quo, whether we think of decolonisation, the 
acceleration of the nuclear arms race, the enlargement of the UN, or the rise of the global 
South as a “third force” through non-alignment. This article has sought to contribute to the 
deconstruction of existing typologies of internationalism and to demonstrate the fluidity of 
visions, networks and shifting convergences across ideological boundaries in this same Cold 
War period. It has shown the influence of a developmental and technological constellation of 
internationalism stemming from interwar technocratic internationalism and comprising expert 
networks and bodies of expert knowledge co-produced by international organisations, and at 
work in the humanitarian response to the Macedonian earthquake. Building on these 
continuities and pre-WW2 networks, various internationalist constellations formed under the 
auspices of the United Nations and with the support of governments whose commitment to 
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37 
 
the principles of the UN reflected their own positioning in the global Cold War. These 
internationalist constellations were not confined to the binary typologies of liberal and 
socialist internationalism which are often used to characterise this period. Instead, visions of 
international cooperation and equitable development were tied to principles such as solidarity 
and “self-reliance”. It can also be said that the internationalist constellations formed around 
these questions at the same time mobilised powerful ideas about sovereignty and international 
status and prestige. Modernity rooted in Western concepts about technological and scientific 
progress merged with local and national cultural tropes and traditions.  
Yugoslavia’s exceptional visibility and active engagement internationally throughout 
the 1950s and the 1960s determined the response of the UN, as well as that of individual 
countries to Skopje’s post-earthquake reconstruction. However, this was also due to a newly 
emerging international consensus on development and visions of post-war and postcolonial 
modernisation. A shared vision for the expansion and perfection of the welfare state lay at the 
heart of these trans-national encounters. The experts and bodies of knowledge they brought 
with them from the developed West and the state socialist East mirrored visions of hybrid 
modernity common in Yugoslavia and in the developing world. Indeed, Western concepts of 
technological achievement, planning and construction were easily translated and adapted to 
local, national contexts. Conversely, as we see in other essays in this issue, the project of the 
rebuilding and the redevelopment of Skopje fits into a longer list of post-war urban projects 
designed to embody an almost utopian social order through the “dreamscapes of the 
architectural avant-garde”.82 Technological advancement was meant to enable the realisation 
of urban visions that were underpinned by optimism, egalitarianism and (architectural) 
modernism. Hence, the Skopje Museum of Contemporary Art could be presented not only as 
a symbol of Polish-Yugoslav cooperation and a “sign of a better future”, but also as “a 
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monument to the technical capacities and abilities of Polish architecture”.83 The entire project 
of reconstruction and planning, including the establishment of the entirely new discipline of 
seismic engineering, ultimately became a monument to the UN’s Cold War development and 
technical assistance agenda and Yugoslavia’s pursuit of socialist modernism and (inter) 
national prestige through non-aligned internationalism, self-reliance and a somewhat utopian 
neutrality.  
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